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Seminars in Politics and Society Tiziana Nazio (CCA)

"Institutional clocks and family structures on the organization of care for children in Italy" Abstract Using time-use data for Italy (2008-09), on a sample of around 3.800 households with children below 14, this paper assesses the differences in the amount of time parents devote to childcare in differently shaped family structures (marital or cohabiting union,…

Seminars in Economics Pietro Veronesi (University of Chicago)

"Habits and Leverage" Abstract Many stylized facts of leverage, trading, and asset prices can be explained by a frictionless general equilibrium model in which agents have heterogeneous endowments and external habit preferences. Our model predicts that aggregate leverage increases in good times when stock prices are high and volatility is low, it should predict low…

Seminars in Economics Pietro Tebaldi (University of Chicago)

"Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA" Abstract To design premium subsidies in a health insurance market it is necessary to estimate consumer demand and study how different subsidy schemes affect insurers’ incentives. Combining data from the Californian ACA marketplace with a model of insurance demand and insurers’…

Seminars in Politics and Society Birgit Pfau-Effinger (University of Hamburg)

"The Contribution of Cultural Change to Welfare State Change - Tracing Cultural Processes" at Campus Einaudi (CLE) Abstract The presentation aims to discuss the question: How can cultural change contribute to institutional change in welfare state institutions? The role of ideas for institutional change is increasingly discussed. The focus is usually on the ideas that are…

Seminars in Economics Jan Stuhler (Universidad Carlos III Madrid)

"Shift-share instruments and the Impact of Immigration" jointly organised by Collegio Carlo Alberto and Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano within the Migration Observatory Abstract A large number of papers in the immigration literature rely on geographic variation in the concentration of immigrants to identify the impact of immigration.  National flows of immigrants are often interacted with…

Monday Lunch Seminars Emilio Paolucci, Paolo Neirotti, Danilo Pesce (Politecnico di Torino)

"ICT-Based Innovation and the Changing Nature of Competition: Evidence from Information Intensive Industries in Italy" Abstract Despite the increasing interest in Information and Communication Technology’s (ICT) potential to transform industry structure and competition, there is still not comprehensive evidence on how ICT-related innovations affect competitive dynamics due to the low number of industry-level studies. Strategic…

Seminars in Economics Piero Gottardi (EUI)

"A Theory of Repurchase Agreements, Collateral Re-use, and Repo Intermediation" Abstract This paper characterizes repurchase agreements (repos) as equilibrium contracts starting from first principles. We show that a repo allows the borrower to augment its consumption today while hedging both agents against future market price risk. As a result, safer assets will command a lower…

Monday Lunch Seminars Toomas Hinnosaar (CCA)

"Rent-seeking contest design" Abstract This paper studies the relationship between information, incentives, and outcomes in rent-seeking contests. A common solution to limiting socially wasteful rent-seeking activities is transparency. I show that information strictly increases efforts in rent-seeking contests. Thus, the socially optimal rent-seeking contest provides as little information as possible about the competition. The model…

Monday Lunch Seminars Matteo Triossi (University of Chile)

"Costly Information acquisition: the role of abstention" Abstract Citizens have little and uneven levels of political knowledge, consistently with the rational ignorance hypothesis. The paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with voluntary voting and endogenous information acquisition accounting for these facts. While, under compulsory voting, majoritarian elections generically fail to completely aggregate…