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Monday Lunch Seminars Julien Penasse (University of Luxembourg)

"Bubbles and Trading Frenzies: Evidence from the Art Market" abstract We use the art market as a laboratory to test speculative bubble models based on investor disagreement. Several aspects distinguish the art market from other markets: it features unlevered and wealthy investors, financial and technological innovations are absent, and transaction costs are substantial. We find…

Monday Lunch Seminars Ignacio Monzon (CCA), Andrea Gallice (CCA)

"Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty" Abstract In a social dilemma, individual incentives and collective interests are at odds. We propose a simple mechanism to sustain full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They observe the actions of some…

Monday Lunch Seminars Roberto Marfe (CCA)

"Labor Rigidity and the Dynamics of the Value Premium" (Note: the seminar is on Wednesday) abstract This paper documents that (i) the labor-share is a strong predictor of both the value and duration premia, (ii) these premia are highly correlated, and (iii) the labor-share does not forecast the component of the value premium orthogonal to the…

Seminars in Economics Enrica Carbone (Seconda Università degli Studi di Napoli)

"Equilibria in Transportation Games with Road Pricing" abstract As congestion pricing is becoming increasingly popular as a solution to traffic congestion in many parts of the world, one issue is how it affects the location of commercial activities. If a cordon charge is constructed around a city center, as in London and Stockholm, for example,…

Monday Lunch Seminars Dino Gerardi (CCA)

"Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty" (Note: the seminar is on Thursday) Abstract We study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one-sided private information. There is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers. Buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in…

Seminars in Economics Paola Conconi (ECARES and CEPR)

"All Together Now: Integration, Delegation and Management" abstract Abstract Little is known theoretically, and even less empirically, about the relationship between firm boundary choices and the allocation of decision rights within firms. We develop a model in which firms choose which suppliers to integrate, whether to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers or keep them centralized,…

Occasional Seminars Allievi Defense Session

SENIOR ALLIEVI 9.00 Francesco CosentinoTitle: "Stochastic Optimal Control with Financial Applications" JUNIOR ALLIEVI 9.45 Alberto CappelloTitle: "Competition and Innovation: when theory and evidence tell different stories" 10.15 Enrico BelliardoTitle: "Hand-to-Mouth Consumers and Fiscal Stimulus Payments" 10.45 Jonas DalmazzoTitle: "Foreign public debt: theory and evidences" 11.15 Gemma GasseauTitle:  "At a minimum, income for all: Minimum Income…

Seminars in Politics and Society Tiziana Nazio (CCA)

"Institutional clocks and family structures on the organization of care for children in Italy" Abstract Using time-use data for Italy (2008-09), on a sample of around 3.800 households with children below 14, this paper assesses the differences in the amount of time parents devote to childcare in differently shaped family structures (marital or cohabiting union,…

Seminars in Economics Pietro Veronesi (University of Chicago)

"Habits and Leverage" Abstract Many stylized facts of leverage, trading, and asset prices can be explained by a frictionless general equilibrium model in which agents have heterogeneous endowments and external habit preferences. Our model predicts that aggregate leverage increases in good times when stock prices are high and volatility is low, it should predict low…

Seminars in Economics Pietro Tebaldi (University of Chicago)

"Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA" Abstract To design premium subsidies in a health insurance market it is necessary to estimate consumer demand and study how different subsidy schemes affect insurers’ incentives. Combining data from the Californian ACA marketplace with a model of insurance demand and insurers’…