Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Asen Kochov (Bonn Graduate School of Economics)

"A Definition of Unforeseen Contingencies" Abstract The paper proposes a choice-theoretic definition of unforeseen contingencies. It is proved that if preference admits a recursive utility representation all contingencies are necessarily foreseen. The paper proceeds axiomatically to develop a nonrecursive model of choice in which some events might be initially unforeseen. The process of updating implied…

Seminars in Economics Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse School of Economics)

"Non-Exclusive Competitionunder Adverse Selection" Abstract A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing condition. Buyers compete by posting menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller can…

Seminars in Economics Francesco Nava (London School of Economics)

"Efficiency in Repeated Two-Action Games with Local Monitoring" ASTRACT The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that for generic beliefs efficiency can be sustained in a sequential equilibrium in which strategies are…

Seminars in Economics Ugo Panizza (UN Conference on Trade and Development)

"Too Much Finance?" AbstractThis paper examines whether there is a threshold above which financial development no longer has a positive effect on economic growth. We develop a simple model in which the expectation of a bailout may lead to a financial sector which is too large with respect to the social optimum. We then use…

Seminars in Economics Shachar Kariv (University of California, Berkeley)

“Who is (More) Rational?” Abstract Revealed preference theory offers a criterion for decision-makingquality: if decisions are high quality then there exists a utility functionthat the choices maximize. We conduct a large-scale field experimentthat enables us to test for consistency with utility maximization. Wefind that high-income and high-education subjects display greater levels of consistency than low-income…

Seminars in Economics Fernando Vega-Redondo (EUI)

"Social networks and the process of globalization" Abstract We propose a stylised dynamic model to understand the role of social networks in the phenomenon we call "globalization." This term refers to the process by which even agents who are geographically far apart come to interact, thus overcoming what would otherwise be a fast saturation of…

Seminars in Economics Jaap Abbring (Tilburg University)

"Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics" Abstract This paper develops a tractable model for the computational and empirical analysis of infinite-horizon oligopoly dynamics. It features aggregate demand uncertainty, sunk entry costs, stochastic idiosyncratic technological progress, and irreversible exit. We develop an algorithm for computing a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium quickly by finding the fixed points to a finite…