Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics Andrew Chesher (University College London)
"Structural Econometrics with Discrete Outcomes" abstract Discrete outcomes are ubiquitous in econometrics. Much information about human behaviour in response to economic stimuli and motivations is provided by data recording variously: choices amongst discrete, ordered or unordered alternatives, attitudes, preferences and strengths of response recorded on ordinal scales, counts of occurrences of events, and so forth.…
Seminars in Economics Valérie Lechene (University College London)
"Efficient responses to targeted cash transfers"
Seminars in Economics Suleyman Basak (London Business School)
"Asset Prices and Institutional Investors"
Seminars in Economics Tommaso Nannicini (Università Bocconi)
"How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign"
Seminars in Economics Juuso Toikka (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
"Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information" (joint with Juan Escobar) abstract We study repeated Bayesian n-player games in which the players' privately known types evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across players, and players have private values. Our main result shows that, with communication, any Pareto-efficient payoff vector above a minmax value can…
Seminars in Economics Chris Taber (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
"Estimation of a Roy/Search/Compensating Di fferentials Model of the LaborMarket"
Seminars in Economics Till Von Wachter (Columbia University)
"The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years"
Seminars in Economics Manuel Bagues (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
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Seminars in Economics Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
"Reputation with Analogical Reasoning" Abstract We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model, exemplied by Fudenberg…
Seminars in Economics Yossi Spiegel (Tel Aviv University)
"Backward integration, forward integration, and vertical foreclosure"
Seminars in Economics Jakub Kastl (Stanford University)
"The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds" Abstract We study European banks’ demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank’s auctions for one-week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Our analysis…
Seminars in Economics Julian Jamison (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston)
"Measuring Preferences and Predicting Outcomes"
Seminars in Economics Miklós Koren (Central European University)
"Machines and machinists: Capital-skill complementarity from an international trade perspective" Abstract We estimate the effect of imported machines on the wages of machine operators utilizing Hungarian linked employer-employee data. We infer exposure to imported machines from detailed trade statistics of the firm and the occupation description of the worker. We find that workers exposed to…
Seminars in Economics Emmanuel Farhi (Harvard University)
"Insurance and Taxation over the Life-Cycle" Download the paper
Seminars in Economics Asen Kochov (Bonn Graduate School of Economics)
"A Definition of Unforeseen Contingencies" Abstract The paper proposes a choice-theoretic definition of unforeseen contingencies. It is proved that if preference admits a recursive utility representation all contingencies are necessarily foreseen. The paper proceeds axiomatically to develop a nonrecursive model of choice in which some events might be initially unforeseen. The process of updating implied…
Seminars in Economics Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse School of Economics)
"Non-Exclusive Competitionunder Adverse Selection" Abstract A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing condition. Buyers compete by posting menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller can…
Seminars in Economics Francesco Nava (London School of Economics)
"Efficiency in Repeated Two-Action Games with Local Monitoring" ASTRACT The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that for generic beliefs efficiency can be sustained in a sequential equilibrium in which strategies are…
Seminars in Economics Ugo Panizza (UN Conference on Trade and Development)
"Too Much Finance?" AbstractThis paper examines whether there is a threshold above which financial development no longer has a positive effect on economic growth. We develop a simple model in which the expectation of a bailout may lead to a financial sector which is too large with respect to the social optimum. We then use…
Seminars in Economics Shachar Kariv (University of California, Berkeley)
“Who is (More) Rational?” Abstract Revealed preference theory offers a criterion for decision-makingquality: if decisions are high quality then there exists a utility functionthat the choices maximize. We conduct a large-scale field experimentthat enables us to test for consistency with utility maximization. Wefind that high-income and high-education subjects display greater levels of consistency than low-income…
Seminars in Economics Jeremy Fox (University of Michigan)
"Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games"