Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Olivier Tercieux (PSE)

"Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets" Abstract We study efficient and stable mechanisms in many-to-one matching markets when the number of agents is large. We first consider an environment where individuals' preferences are drawn randomly from a class of distributions allowing for both common value and idiosyncratic components. In this context, as the market…

Seminars in Economics Branko Urosevic (University of Belgrade)

"Globalization, Exchange Rate Regimes and Financial Contagion" abstract The crisis of the Euro zone brought to the fore important questions including: what isthe proper level of financial integration and what are the optimal exchange rate arrangements between countries that are part of tightly knit financial networks. Using a simple Diamond-Dybvig-style theoretical model we show that…

Seminars in Economics Arie Kapteyn (RAND)

"Do Consumers Know How to Value Annuities? Complexity as a Barrier to Annuitization" abstract This paper provides evidence that complexity of the annuitization decision process – rather than a preference for lump-sums –may help explain observed low levels of annuity purchases. We test this using Social Security benefits as our choice setting in an experimental module…

Seminars in Economics Andrea Pozzi (EIEF)

"The Effect of Internet Distribution on Brick-and-mortar Sales" abstract I study the introduction of an online shopping service for a large supermarket chain that also operates a wide network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, inducing only limited cannibalization on traditional sales. I…

Seminars in Economics Roberto Galbiati (CNRS and Sciences Po)

"Earthquakes, Religion, and Institutional Change: Evidence from a Historical Experiment" abstract For a panel of 70 Episcopal see cities (governed by a bishop) over 300 years in the medieval northerncentral Italy, we document that occurrence of an earthquake retarded transition from feudal regime to commune. This evidence is consistent with the idea that shocks heightening people’s religiosity,…

Seminars in Economics Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)

"Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria" Abstract Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play captures talk about…