Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics Jonathan Eaton (Penn State)
"International trade: linking micro and macro"
Seminars in Economics Branko Urosevic (University of Belgrade)
"Globalization, Exchange Rate Regimes and Financial Contagion" abstract The crisis of the Euro zone brought to the fore important questions including: what isthe proper level of financial integration and what are the optimal exchange rate arrangements between countries that are part of tightly knit financial networks. Using a simple Diamond-Dybvig-style theoretical model we show that…
Seminars in Economics Arie Kapteyn (RAND)
"Do Consumers Know How to Value Annuities? Complexity as a Barrier to Annuitization" abstract This paper provides evidence that complexity of the annuitization decision process – rather than a preference for lump-sums –may help explain observed low levels of annuity purchases. We test this using Social Security benefits as our choice setting in an experimental module…
Seminars in Economics Andrea Pozzi (EIEF)
"The Effect of Internet Distribution on Brick-and-mortar Sales" abstract I study the introduction of an online shopping service for a large supermarket chain that also operates a wide network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, inducing only limited cannibalization on traditional sales. I…
Seminars in Economics CANCELLED: John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)
"Management as a Technology"
Seminars in Economics Roberto Galbiati (CNRS and Sciences Po)
"Earthquakes, Religion, and Institutional Change: Evidence from a Historical Experiment" abstract For a panel of 70 Episcopal see cities (governed by a bishop) over 300 years in the medieval northerncentral Italy, we document that occurrence of an earthquake retarded transition from feudal regime to commune. This evidence is consistent with the idea that shocks heightening people’s religiosity,…
Seminars in Economics Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
"Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria" Abstract Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play captures talk about…
Seminars in Economics Pieter Gautier (VU University Amsterdam)
"Sorting and the Output Loss Due to Search"
Seminars in Economics Debopam Bhattacharya (University of Oxford)
SEMINAR CANCELLED
Seminars in Economics Fabiano Schivardi (Cagliari and EIEF)
"Demand or productivity:What determines firm growth?"
Seminars in Economics Jerome Adda (European University Institute)
"Career Progression, Economic Downturns and Skills"
Seminars in Economics Steve Machin (University College London)
"Rising Wage Inequality and Postgraduate Education"
Seminars in Economics Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (International Monetary Fund)
"Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk-Taking"
Seminars in Economics Joan Llull (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
"Immigration, Wages, and Education:A Labor Market Equilibrium Structural Model"
Seminars in Economics Sebastian Galiani (Washington University in St. Louis)
"Estimating Neighborhood Choice Models: Lessons From The Moving to Opportunity Experiment"
Seminars in Economics Antonella Trigari (Università Bocconi)
"Financial Markets and Unemployment" abstract We study the importance of financial markets for (un)employment fluctuations in a model with matching frictions where firms issue debt under limited enforcement. Higher debt allows employers to bargain lower wages which in turn increases the incentive to create jobs. The transmission mechanism of `credit shocks' is different from the typical…
Seminars in Economics Bill Sandholm (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
"Sampling Best Response Dynamics and Deterministic Equilibrium Selection" Abstract We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of…
Seminars in Economics Roman Inderst (Goethe University Frankfurt)
"Preserving Debt or Equity Capacity?" abstract In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" through choosing high target leverage or "debt capacity" through choosing low target leverage. Thereby, firms reduce a problem of underinvestment or overinvestment when they must raise future financing under asymmetric information. Which problem…
Seminars in Economics Giovanni Peri (University of California, Davis)
"The Effect of International Trade and Migration on Income" abstract This paper explores the relationship between economic openness and income per person using crosscountry data. To address endogeneity concerns we extend the instrumental-variables strategy first usedby Frankel and Romer (1999). First, we show that geographic characteristics, relative to the location of acountry are successful in…