Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Andrea Mattozzi (EUI)

"The Right Type of Legislator" abstract Research suggests that U.S. legislators represent their richer constituents. We show theoretically that this is due to the institutional structure in the US, in which legislators are expected to provide particularistic benefits to their constituents. We develop a citizen-candidate model of redistribution between both rich and poor citizens, and…

Seminars in Economics Dan Black (Univ Chicago)

"Duke Grads, Monkeys, and Jobs and Wall Street: The Use and Misuse of Latent Variables" abstract We consider common Item Response Theory (IRT) measures of latent variables and consider their use as independent variables in regression analysis. We show that because of the inherent measurement error in the construction of IRT scores that OLS estimates…

Seminars in Economics Alberto Manconi (Tilburg University)

"Do Short Sellers Care About Corporate Hedging?" abstract We study the relationship between corporate hedging and short selling, using a novel data set on short sales of US equities over the period 2002-2009, and hand-collected data on corporate hedging. We document that hedging is associated with lower uncertainty, i.e., lower analyst forecast dispersion and greater breadth of ownership. This should…

Seminars in Economics Ulrich Doraszelski (Wharton)

"Measuring the Bias of Technological Change" Abstract When technological change occurs, it can increase the productivity of capital, labor,and the other factors of production in equal terms or it can be biased towards a specificfactor. Whether technological change favors some factors of production over othersis an empirical question that is central to economics. The literatures…

Seminars in Economics Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

"Decentralized Exchange" abstract This paper develops an equilibrium model of decentralized trading which accommodatesany coexisting exchanges, including networks and more general, common market structuresrepresented by hypergraphs. The model allows for any number of strategic traders and multipledivisible assets. We characterize equilibrium and welfare, and develop comparative statics withrespect to preferences, assets and market structures. Asset…