Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Fabien Postel-Vinay (UCL)

"Did the Job Ladder Fail After the Great Recession?" Abstract We study employment reallocation across heterogeneous employers through the lens of a dynamic job-ladder model, where moreproductive employers spend more hiring effort and are more likely to succeed in hiring because they offer more. As a consequence, anemployer's size is a relevant proxy for productivity. We exploit…

Seminars in Economics Sven Rady (University of Bonn)

"Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games" Abstract This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria that they generalize. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the…

Seminars in Economics Debopam Bhattacharya (Oxford)

"Nonparametric Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice" Abstract We consider empirical measurement of exact equivalent/compensating variation resulting from price-change of a discrete good, using individual-level data. Our set-up comprises utility functions which include unobserved heterogeneity of unknown dimension and are not required to be quasi-linear, parametrically specified or smooth -- thus allowing for extremely general preference-distributions.…

Seminars in Economics Antonio Guarino (UCL)

"Transaction Tax and the Information Efficiency of Financial Markets: A Structural Estimation" abstract We study the effect of a transaction tax on the trading activity of a security. In our model there are informed traders, who receive private information on the value of a security, and noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons. Through a…

Seminars in Economics Joel Sobel (UC San Diego)

"Why Don't People Lie More" Abstract Economic theory bases its predictions on the assumptions that agents maximize preferences subject to accurate assessments about the environment.  A stylized economic agent who cares only about his material payoffs will say and do whatever is necessary to maximize his payoff. Yet in natural and experimental settings, agents do…

Seminars in Economics Alessandra Voena (University of Chicago)

"Prenuptial Contracts, Labor Supply and Household Investments" Abstract This paper examines prenuptial contracts that allow couples in Italy to  choose, at virtually no cost, how their assets will be divided in case of divorce. Unique administrative data on marriages and divorces from 1995 to 2011 indicate that the majority of newlyweds (67% in 2011) choose…

Seminars in Economics Toan Phan (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

"Toxic Asset Bubble" Abstract We show that toxic (i.e., welfare reducing) asset bubbles can emerge in a standard framework of stochastic rational bubble if there is financial friction. The friction generated by limited liability and non-contingent debt contracts prevents banks from fully internalizing the bubble's risk of collapse. Hence boom-bust episodes involving excessively risky bubbles can emerge in equilibrium. We…