Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Debopam Bhattacharya (Oxford)

"Nonparametric Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice" Abstract We consider empirical measurement of exact equivalent/compensating variation resulting from price-change of a discrete good, using individual-level data. Our set-up comprises utility functions which include unobserved heterogeneity of unknown dimension and are not required to be quasi-linear, parametrically specified or smooth -- thus allowing for extremely general preference-distributions.…

Seminars in Economics Antonio Guarino (UCL)

"Transaction Tax and the Information Efficiency of Financial Markets: A Structural Estimation" abstract We study the effect of a transaction tax on the trading activity of a security. In our model there are informed traders, who receive private information on the value of a security, and noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons. Through a…

Seminars in Economics Joel Sobel (UC San Diego)

"Why Don't People Lie More" Abstract Economic theory bases its predictions on the assumptions that agents maximize preferences subject to accurate assessments about the environment.  A stylized economic agent who cares only about his material payoffs will say and do whatever is necessary to maximize his payoff. Yet in natural and experimental settings, agents do…

Seminars in Economics Alessandra Voena (University of Chicago)

"Prenuptial Contracts, Labor Supply and Household Investments" Abstract This paper examines prenuptial contracts that allow couples in Italy to  choose, at virtually no cost, how their assets will be divided in case of divorce. Unique administrative data on marriages and divorces from 1995 to 2011 indicate that the majority of newlyweds (67% in 2011) choose…

Seminars in Economics Toan Phan (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

"Toxic Asset Bubble" Abstract We show that toxic (i.e., welfare reducing) asset bubbles can emerge in a standard framework of stochastic rational bubble if there is financial friction. The friction generated by limited liability and non-contingent debt contracts prevents banks from fully internalizing the bubble's risk of collapse. Hence boom-bust episodes involving excessively risky bubbles can emerge in equilibrium. We…

Seminars in Economics Kota Saito (Caltech)

"Savage in the Market" Download program Abstract We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a revealed preference axiom if and only if there exists a…

Seminars in Economics Stefano Gagliarducci (Università di Roma Tor Vergata)

"The Labor Market Returns to Political Connections" abstract In this paper we document the labor market returns to being a family member of a politician in office. To this purpose, we link data for 16 years on the universe of politicians in Italy with a 1/91 random sample of private sector employees, based on the…

Seminars in Economics CANCELLED: Georg Weizsacker (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

"An Experiment on Social Mislearning" abstract We investigate theories of social learning in two experiments based on simple arithmetic that isolate errors in inference from those in Bayesian updating.  In the first experiment, players move one-person-per-period and observe all predecessors’ actions. Although 75% of participants adhere to BNE in this experiment, they realize less than one-fifth of the payoff gains…