Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Arnaud Dupuy (CEPS, INSTEAD)

"Migration in China: to Work or to Wed?" Abstract Why do people migrate? In this paper we study the trade-offs between migrating to work and migrating to wed. To this aim, we develop a marriage matching model in which men and women, are initially distributed over various locations, i.e. were born and raised in various…

Seminars in Economics Ilse Lindenlaub (EUI)

"Sorting Multidimensional Types: Theory and Application" abstract This paper studies multidimensional matching between workers and jobs. Workers dier in manualand cognitive skills and sort into jobs that demand dierent combinations of these two skills.To study this multidimensional sorting, I develop a theoretical framework that generalizes theunidimensional notion of assortative matching. I derive the equilibrium in…

Seminars in Economics Fabien Postel-Vinay (UCL)

"Did the Job Ladder Fail After the Great Recession?" Abstract We study employment reallocation across heterogeneous employers through the lens of a dynamic job-ladder model, where moreproductive employers spend more hiring effort and are more likely to succeed in hiring because they offer more. As a consequence, anemployer's size is a relevant proxy for productivity. We exploit…

Seminars in Economics Sven Rady (University of Bonn)

"Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games" Abstract This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria that they generalize. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the…

Seminars in Economics Debopam Bhattacharya (Oxford)

"Nonparametric Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice" Abstract We consider empirical measurement of exact equivalent/compensating variation resulting from price-change of a discrete good, using individual-level data. Our set-up comprises utility functions which include unobserved heterogeneity of unknown dimension and are not required to be quasi-linear, parametrically specified or smooth -- thus allowing for extremely general preference-distributions.…

Seminars in Economics Antonio Guarino (UCL)

"Transaction Tax and the Information Efficiency of Financial Markets: A Structural Estimation" abstract We study the effect of a transaction tax on the trading activity of a security. In our model there are informed traders, who receive private information on the value of a security, and noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons. Through a…