Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics

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Seminars in Economics Jeff Ely (Nothwestern University)

"Dynamic Multi-Agent Persuasion" abstract I study dynamic persuasion mechanisms with multiple agents.  A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to strategically interacting agents.  Filtering information allows the principal to control beliefs and higher order beliefs, thereby influencing the behavior of agents.  In a stylized example of a…

Seminars in Economics Rachel Griffith (IFS)

"Estimating Demand Parameters with Choice Set Misspecication" abstract We describe methods to estimate demand parameters in the presence of choice set misspeci-cation due to unobserved individual choice sets. We show that a consumer's probability ofmaking a choice from her true choice set can be written as the probability she makes the samechoice from a universal…

Seminars in Economics Andrea Weber (University of Mannheim)

"Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?" abstract Contrary to standard search model predictions, prior studies failed to estimate a positive effectof unemployment insurance (UI) on reemployment wages. This paper estimates a positive UIwage effect exploiting an age-based regression discontinuity in Austrian administrative data. Asearch model incorporating duration dependence determines the UI wage effect as…

Seminars in Economics Jordi Gali (CREI and UPF)

"Insider-Outsider Labor Markets, Hysteresis and Monetary Policy" Abstract I develop a version of the New Keynesian model with insideroutsider labor markets and hysteresis that can account for the high persistence of of European unemployment. I study the implications of that environment for the design of monetary policy. A simple interest rule that includes the unemployment…

Seminars in Economics Francesco Squintani (University of Warwick)

"Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections" Abstract Does electoral competition induce office motivated candidates to commit to policies that reflect their information? Or do candidates hide their information, and pander to the electorate's beliefs? We find that efficient information aggregation is precluded, but candidates' platforms may be informative: Equilibrium policy can at best be based…

Seminars in Economics Matt Wiswall (Arizona State University)

"Estimation of Children's Skill Formation when Children's. Skills are Unobserved" abstract We develop a new estimator for the process of skill formation where individuals' skills are unobserved (latent) and measured in data with error. Our model of skill formation has a dynamic factor structure where the latent skills of individuals evolve endogenously over the life-cycle…

Seminars in Economics Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University)

"Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia, Front-Running and Relationship Banking" Abstract We build a linear-quadratic model to analyze trading in a market with pri-vate information and heterogeneous agents. Agents receive private endowment shocks and trade continuously. Agents dier in their need for trade as well assize, i.e. the ability to stay away from their ideal positions. In…

Seminars in Economics Michele Pellizzari (University of Geneva)

"Wage compression within the firm" abstract We study the distributional effect of a wage indexation mechanism - the textit{Scala Mobile} (SM) - that heavily compressed the distribution of Italian wages during the 1970s and 1980s. By imposing nominal adjustments to all workers in the economy, the SM increased real wages at the bottom of the…