Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics
Seminars in Economics Eddie Dekel (Northwestern/Tel Aviv)
"Optimal Allocation with Costly Veri
Seminars in Economics Michel Serafinelli (Toronto)
"Good Firms, Worker Flows and Local Productivity"
Seminars in Economics Adam Rosen (UCL)
"Generalized instrumental variable models"
Seminars in Economics Fabien Postel-Vinay (UCL)
"Did the Job Ladder Fail After the Great Recession?" Abstract We study employment reallocation across heterogeneous employers through the lens of a dynamic job-ladder model, where moreproductive employers spend more hiring effort and are more likely to succeed in hiring because they offer more. As a consequence, anemployer's size is a relevant proxy for productivity. We exploit…
Seminars in Economics Sven Rady (University of Bonn)
"Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games" Abstract This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria that they generalize. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the…
Seminars in Economics Peter Sørensen (Copenaghen)
"Regulation of Dierentiated Stock Exchanges"
Seminars in Economics Debopam Bhattacharya (Oxford)
"Nonparametric Welfare Analysis for Discrete Choice" Abstract We consider empirical measurement of exact equivalent/compensating variation resulting from price-change of a discrete good, using individual-level data. Our set-up comprises utility functions which include unobserved heterogeneity of unknown dimension and are not required to be quasi-linear, parametrically specified or smooth -- thus allowing for extremely general preference-distributions.…
Seminars in Economics Raman Uppal (EDHEC Business School)
"Comparing Different Regulatory Measures to Control Stock Market Volatility: A General Equilibrium Analysis"
Seminars in Economics Jeremy Lise (UCL)
"The Macro-dynamics of Sorting between Workersand Firms"
Seminars in Economics Antonio Guarino (UCL)
"Transaction Tax and the Information Efficiency of Financial Markets: A Structural Estimation" abstract We study the effect of a transaction tax on the trading activity of a security. In our model there are informed traders, who receive private information on the value of a security, and noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons. Through a…
Seminars in Economics Cheti Nicoletti (York)
"Sibling spillover eects inschool test scores"
Seminars in Economics Vicente Cunat (LSE)
"Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance"
Seminars in Economics Gazhala Azmat (Queen Mary)
"The Distribution of Talent across Contests"
Seminars in Economics Peter Neary (Oxford)
"Not so demanding: Preference structure, firm behavior, and welfare"
Seminars in Economics Joel Sobel (UC San Diego)
"Why Don't People Lie More" Abstract Economic theory bases its predictions on the assumptions that agents maximize preferences subject to accurate assessments about the environment. A stylized economic agent who cares only about his material payoffs will say and do whatever is necessary to maximize his payoff. Yet in natural and experimental settings, agents do…
Seminars in Economics Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown)
"Dynamic Mechanism Designfor a Global Commons"
Seminars in Economics Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern)
"A Common Value Auction with Bidder Solicitation"