Seminars

Seminars

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Seminars in Economics Juuso Toikka (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

"Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information" (joint with Juan Escobar) abstract We study repeated Bayesian n-player games in which the players' privately known types evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across players, and players have private values. Our main result shows that, with communication, any Pareto-efficient payoff vector above a minmax value can…

Monday Lunch Seminars Marina Di Giacomo (Università di Torino)

"Bilateral Trust and the Ownership Structure of Foreign Direct Investments: Evidence from European Firm Level Data" abstract It is often argued that the foreign direct investments (FDIs) have positive effects on host countries. In particular, multinationals tend to have some competitive advantage based on superior technology or other firm-specic knowledge and, therefore, inward FDIs are…

Seminars in Statistics Matthias Birkner (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany)

Ancestral lineages under local regulation The spatial embeddings of genealogies in models with fluctuating population sizes and local regulation are relatively complicated random walks in a space-time dependent random environment. They seem presently not well understood. We use the supercritical discrete-time contact process on Z^d as the simplest non-trivial example of a locally regulated population…

Monday Lunch Seminars Roberto Leombruni (University of Torino and LABOR)

"For a Fistful of Euros. Tales of Ordinary unemployment" abstract In most developed countries the insurance against involuntary unemployment is a pivotal policy in the support of workers. In Italy, it has just a marginal role; furthermore, it is currently questioned for the very low coverage it grants to its target population. In this paper we…

Seminars in Economics Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

"Reputation with Analogical Reasoning" Abstract We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model, exemplied by Fudenberg…

Seminars in Statistics Antonio Colangelo (European Central Bank)

Banks' Balance Sheet Statistics and Financial Flows in the Euro Area The analysis of money and credit developments is core to the conduct of monetary policy. Those statistics are constructed in the euro area starting from the balance sheets of resident banks. By appropriately netting banks' cross-positions in the euro area, aggregated positions are identified…

Job Market Seminars Edoardo Grillo (Princeton University)

"Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission" abstract We consider the interaction between an informed agent (A) who can make announcements concerning the information she has and an uninformed agent (B) who has to decide whether to start a project or not. We study the role that reference dependence and loss aversion may play…