Seminars
Seminars
Seminars in Economics Tommaso Nannicini (Università Bocconi)
"How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign"
Seminars in Economics of Innovation and Knowledge Anthony Arundel, MERIT, Maastricht
"Understanding innovation in the public sector: Survey results from Europe"
Monday Lunch Seminars Marcello Sartarelli (University of Alicante)
"Do Performance Targets A ffect Financial Support to Schools? Evidence from Discontinuities in Test Scores"
Seminars in Economics Juuso Toikka (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
"Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information" (joint with Juan Escobar) abstract We study repeated Bayesian n-player games in which the players' privately known types evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across players, and players have private values. Our main result shows that, with communication, any Pareto-efficient payoff vector above a minmax value can…
Seminars in Economics Chris Taber (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
"Estimation of a Roy/Search/Compensating Di fferentials Model of the LaborMarket"
Monday Lunch Seminars Marina Di Giacomo (Università di Torino)
"Bilateral Trust and the Ownership Structure of Foreign Direct Investments: Evidence from European Firm Level Data" abstract It is often argued that the foreign direct investments (FDIs) have positive effects on host countries. In particular, multinationals tend to have some competitive advantage based on superior technology or other firm-specic knowledge and, therefore, inward FDIs are…
Seminars in Statistics Matthias Birkner (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany)
Ancestral lineages under local regulation The spatial embeddings of genealogies in models with fluctuating population sizes and local regulation are relatively complicated random walks in a space-time dependent random environment. They seem presently not well understood. We use the supercritical discrete-time contact process on Z^d as the simplest non-trivial example of a locally regulated population…
Seminars in Economics Till Von Wachter (Columbia University)
"The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years"
Seminars in Economics Manuel Bagues (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
SEMINAR CANCELLED
Seminars in Economics of Innovation and Knowledge Ari Van-Assche, HEC Montréal
"The role of trade costs in global production networks: Evidence from China's processing trade regime"
Monday Lunch Seminars Roberto Leombruni (University of Torino and LABOR)
"For a Fistful of Euros. Tales of Ordinary unemployment" abstract In most developed countries the insurance against involuntary unemployment is a pivotal policy in the support of workers. In Italy, it has just a marginal role; furthermore, it is currently questioned for the very low coverage it grants to its target population. In this paper we…
Occasional Seminars Comparing Welfare States: Institutions and Outcomes
1st Carlo Alberto Module - A.A. 2011/2012
Monday Lunch Seminars Claudio Campanale (Universidad de Alicante & CeRP), Carolina Fugazza (Università di Torino & CeRP)
"Life-Cycle Portfolio Choice with Liquid andIlliquid Financial Assets"
Job Market Seminars Luigi Iovino (MIT)
"Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility"
Monday Lunch Seminars Massimo Rostagno (European Central Bank)
"Financial Factors in Economic Fluctuations"
Seminars in Statistics Alessandro Arlotto (University of Pennsylvania)
"Optimal Hiring and Retention Policies for Heterogeneous Workers who Learn"
Job Market Seminars Alessandro Arlotto (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
"Optimal Hiring and Retention Policies for Heterogeneous Workers who Learn"
Seminars in Economics of Innovation and Knowledge Roberto Gabriele, Università di Trento
"Evaluating the impacts of R&D subsidies: The effectiveness of a local intervention" (at Dipartimento di Economia S. Cognetti de Martiis, Sala Seminari)
Seminars in Economics Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
"Reputation with Analogical Reasoning" Abstract We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model, exemplied by Fudenberg…