Monday Lunch Seminars
Monday Lunch Seminars
Monday Lunch Seminars Pierluigi Conzo (University of Turin & CSEF)
"Trust and Cheating in Sri Lanka: The Role of Experimentally-Induced Emotions about Tsunami"
Monday Lunch Seminars Federico Boffa (Free University of Bolzano)
"Should Different People have Different Governments?"
Monday Lunch Seminars Ainhoa Aparicio Fenoll (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Education Policies and Migration across European Countries"
Monday Lunch Seminars Emanuele Bracco (Lancaster University)
"The Effect of Immigration and Immigration Policies on the Underground Economy?"
Monday Lunch Seminars Bruno Contini (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"A neo-keynesian proposal for restoring growth in the Italian economy" abstract A neo-keynesian suggestion aimed at recovering after twenty years of dramatic economic crisis has recently been put forward in Italy. There are reasons to suppose that analogous measures could be reasonably adapted to other EU countries where the wellbeing of the low-middle class is…
Monday Lunch Seminars Tugba Zeydanli (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Social Interactions in Job Satisfaction"
Monday Lunch Seminars Massimiano Bucchi (Università di Trento and Collegio Carlo Alberto)
“Norms, competition and visibility in contemporary science: the legacy of Robert K Merton” (Note: the seminar is on Friday) Abstract Can Robert K. Merton’s seminal work in the sociology of science still offer useful insights to understand key features, trends and challenges of science in contemporary societies? This paper focuses on two main topics. It addresses…
Monday Lunch Seminars Toru Kitagawa (UCL)
"A Test for Instrument Validity" Abstract This paper develops a specification test for instrument validity in the heterogeneous treatment effect model with a binary treatment and a discrete instrument. The strongest testable implication for instrument validity is given by the condition for non-negativity of point- identifiable complier’s outcome densities. Our specification test infers this testable…
Monday Lunch Seminars Dino Gerardi (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect"
Monday Lunch Seminars Juan Carlo Carbajal (University of New South Wales)
"Inconspicuous conspicuous consumption” (Note: the seminar is on Friday)
Monday Lunch Seminars Giuseppe Lopomo (Duke University, Fuqua School of Business)
"Budget-Constrained Procurement'' Abstract We characterize optimal procurement mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer facing suppliers with privately known costs. Optimal mechanisms can be implemented by simple sequential auctions.
Monday Lunch Seminars Andrea Buffa (School of Management Boston University)
"Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices" (Note: the seminar is on Thursday)
Monday Lunch Seminars Roberto Marfè (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Income Insurance and the Equilibrium Term-Structure of Equity"
Monday Lunch Seminars Toomas Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Optimal mechanisms with risk-loving buyers"
Monday Lunch Seminars Michael Zhang (HKUST)
"Social Bias in Online Product Ratings - AQuasi-Experimental Study" (Note: the seminar is on Thursday)
Monday Lunch Seminars Pietro Terna (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"From Agent-based models to network analysis (and return)"
Monday Lunch Seminars Marit Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
"Sales and nonlinear prices when consumers have time inconsistent preferences" (Note: the seminar is on Thursday)
Monday Lunch Seminars Alan Kirman (Université d’Aix-Marseille III)
"The Crisis in Economic Theory" abstract This presentation will suggest that we need an alternative approach to economic modeling in general, and macroeconomic modelling in particular, if we are to capture salient characteristics of recent economic developments. There has been an implicit acceptance of the idea that an economy in which individuals are left essentially to their own devices will…
Monday Lunch Seminars Suvi Vasama (Humboldt University of Berlin)
"Real Options and Dynamic Incentives" abstract We examine a dynamic principal-agent model in which the output is correlated over time. The optimal contract determines a payment schedule from the principal to the agent and a liquidation policy. Incentive compatibility, together with the agent’s limited liability, requires that the firm is liquidated following a history of low returns. With…
Monday Lunch Seminars Juan Ortner (Boston University)
"Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure"