Monday Lunch Seminars

Monday Lunch Seminars

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Monday Lunch Seminars Bruno Contini (Collegio Carlo Alberto)

"A neo-keynesian proposal for restoring growth in the Italian economy" abstract A neo-keynesian suggestion aimed at recovering after twenty years of dramatic economic crisis has recently been put forward in Italy. There are reasons to suppose that analogous measures could be reasonably adapted to other EU countries where the wellbeing of the low-middle class is…

Monday Lunch Seminars Massimiano Bucchi (Università di Trento and Collegio Carlo Alberto)

“Norms, competition and visibility in contemporary science: the legacy of Robert K Merton” (Note: the seminar is on Friday) Abstract Can Robert K. Merton’s seminal work in the sociology of science still offer useful insights to understand key features, trends and challenges of science in contemporary societies? This paper focuses on two main topics. It addresses…

Monday Lunch Seminars Toru Kitagawa (UCL)

"A Test for Instrument Validity" Abstract This paper develops a specification test for instrument validity in the heterogeneous treatment effect model with a binary treatment and a discrete instrument. The strongest testable implication for instrument validity is given by the condition for non-negativity of point- identifiable complier’s outcome densities. Our specification test infers this testable…

Monday Lunch Seminars Alan Kirman (Université d’Aix-Marseille III)

"The Crisis in Economic Theory" abstract This presentation will suggest that we need an alternative approach to economic modeling in general, and macroeconomic modelling in particular, if we are to capture salient characteristics of recent economic developments. There has been an implicit acceptance of the idea that an economy in which individuals are left essentially to their own devices will…

Monday Lunch Seminars Suvi Vasama (Humboldt University of Berlin)

"Real Options and Dynamic Incentives" abstract We examine a dynamic principal-agent model in which the output is correlated over time. The optimal contract determines a payment schedule from the principal to the agent and a liquidation policy. Incentive compatibility, together with the agent’s limited liability, requires that the firm is liquidated following a history of low returns. With…