Job Market Seminars
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Job Market Seminars
Job Market Seminars Michael Richter (New York University)
"Mechanism Design With Budget Constraints and a Continuum of Agents" abstract This paper studies mechanisms for assigning a divisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents where agents' private valuations and budgetsare independently distributed. In this setting, I nd the welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning the good. Both of these optimal mecha-nisms feature a…
Job Market Seminars Lucas Maestri (Yale)
"Dynamic Contracting under Adverse Selection and Renegotiation"
Job Market Seminars Priscila Souza (Yale)
"Moral Hazard in the Family"
Job Market Seminars Kurt Lavetti (Cornell University)
"Dynamic Labor Supply with a Deadly Catch"
Job Market Seminars Andrea Ajello (Northwestern University)
"Financial Intermediation, Investment Dynamics and Business Cycle Fluctuations"
Job Market Seminars Robert Zymek (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
"Factor Proportions and the Growth of World Trade"