Job Market Seminars

Job Market Seminars

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Job Market Seminars Toomas Hinnosaar (Northwestern University)

"Calendar Mechanisms" abstract I study a repeated mechanism design problem where a revenue-maximizing monopolist sells a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving buyers with private values and increasing exit rates. In addition to characterizing the fully optimal mechanism, I study the optimal mechanisms in two restricted classes. First, the pure calendar mechanism, where…

Job Market Seminars Giuseppe Fiori (Universidade de São Paulo)

"The Macroeconomic Effects of Goods and Labor Markets Deregulation" abstract We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous producer entry and labor market frictions to study the macroeconomic effects of deregulating product and labor markets in Europe. Three results emerge. First, deregulation has positive welfare effects, but it can involve short-run costs, including…

Job Market Seminars Michael Richter (New York University)

"Mechanism Design With Budget Constraints and a Continuum of Agents" abstract This paper studies mechanisms for assigning a divisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents where agents' private valuations and budgetsare independently distributed. In this setting, I nd the welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning the good. Both of these optimal mecha-nisms feature a…