Job Market Seminars
Job Market Seminars
Job Market Seminars Roberto Marfè (Swiss Finance Institute and University of Lausanne)
"Realized Expectations and the Equilibrium Risk-Return Trade Off"
Job Market Seminars Marco Di Maggio (MIT)
"Market Turmoil and Destabilizing Speculation"
Job Market Seminars Diego Ronchetti (University of Lugano)
"An Empirical Studyof Stock and American Option Prices"
Job Market Seminars Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr (European University Institute)
"Towards a Theory of Trade Finance"
Job Market Seminars Alessandro Dovis (University of Minnesota)
"Efficient Sovereign Default"
Job Market Seminars Nicola Branzoli (University of Wisconsin Madison)
"The Effect of Intermediaries' Market Power in Decentralized Asset Markets"
Job Market Seminars Francesc Dilme (University of Pennsylvania)
"Building (and Milking) Trust: Reputation as a Moral Hazard Phenomenon"
Job Market Seminars Fadi Hassan (London School of Economics)
"The Price of Development"
Job Market Seminars Nicolaj Harmon (Princeton University)
"Are Workers Better Matched in Large Labor Markets?"
Job Market Seminars Marit Hinnosaar (Northwestern University)
"Time Inconsistency and Alcohol Sales Restrictions" Download the paper here
Job Market Seminars Giuliano Antonio Curatola (Swiss Finance Institute and EPFL)
"Asset Prices with Heterogeneous Loss Averse Investors"
Job Market Seminars Andrea Ferrero (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
"The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluationof the Fed’s Liquidity Facilities"
Job Market Seminars Luigi Iovino (MIT)
"Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility"
Job Market Seminars Alessandro Arlotto (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
"Optimal Hiring and Retention Policies for Heterogeneous Workers who Learn"
Job Market Seminars Edoardo Grillo (Princeton University)
"Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission" abstract We consider the interaction between an informed agent (A) who can make announcements concerning the information she has and an uninformed agent (B) who has to decide whether to start a project or not. We study the role that reference dependence and loss aversion may play…
Job Market Seminars Gonçalo Pina (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
“The Recent Growth of International Reserves in Developing Economies: A Monetary Perspective”
Job Market Seminars Andrea Tesei (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
"Racial Fragmentation, Income Inequality and Social Capital Formation: New Evidence from the US" abstract Existing studies of social capital formation in US metropolitan areas have found that social capital is lower when there is more income inequality and greater racial fragmentation. I add to this literature by examining the role of income inequality between racial…
Job Market Seminars Toomas Hinnosaar (Northwestern University)
"Calendar Mechanisms" abstract I study a repeated mechanism design problem where a revenue-maximizing monopolist sells a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving buyers with private values and increasing exit rates. In addition to characterizing the fully optimal mechanism, I study the optimal mechanisms in two restricted classes. First, the pure calendar mechanism, where…
Job Market Seminars Giuseppe Fiori (Universidade de São Paulo)
"The Macroeconomic Effects of Goods and Labor Markets Deregulation" abstract We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous producer entry and labor market frictions to study the macroeconomic effects of deregulating product and labor markets in Europe. Three results emerge. First, deregulation has positive welfare effects, but it can involve short-run costs, including…
Job Market Seminars Michael Richter (New York University)
"Mechanism Design With Budget Constraints and a Continuum of Agents" abstract This paper studies mechanisms for assigning a divisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents where agents' private valuations and budgetsare independently distributed. In this setting, I nd the welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning the good. Both of these optimal mecha-nisms feature a…