![Loading Events](https://b3357354.smushcdn.com/3357354/wp-content/plugins/the-events-calendar/src/resources/images/tribe-loading.gif?lossy=0&strip=1&webp=1)
Tangren Feng (Bocconi University)
13 March 2024 @ 12:00 - 13:15
- Past event
Interim Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: Designing Simple Mechanisms in Complex Environments
Abstract. We study interim strategy-proof (ISP) Mechanisms with interdependent values: It requires that truth-telling is an interim dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., conditional on an agent’s own private information, the truth-telling maximizes her interim expected payoff for all possible strategies the other agents could use. We provide full characterizations of ISP mechanisms in two classical settings: single unit auctions and binary collective decision-makings. Our results highlight the tension between informational externalities and strategic externalities when designing ISP mechanisms.
Joint work with Qinggong Wu at HKUST.