Sergei Glebkin (INSEAD) (webinar)
11 November 2020 @ 15:00 - 16:15
- Past event
“Simultaneous Multilateral Search”
Abstract: This paper studies simultaneous multilateral search (SMS) in over-the-counter (OTC) markets: when searching, an investor contacts several potential counterparties and then trades with the one offering the best quote. Search intensity (how frequently one can search) and search capacity (how many potential counterparties one can contact) affect market qualities differently. Contrasting SMS to bilateral bargaining (BB), the model shows that investors might favor BB over SMS if search intensity is high or in distress. Such preference for BB hurts allocative efficiency and suggests an intrinsic hindrance in the adoption of all-to-all and request-for-quote type of electronic trading in OTC markets.
Joint with Bart Yueshen (INSEAD).
Zoom Link https://us02web.
Meeting ID: 810 6487 7787
Passcode: 733237
