Raffaele Corvino (Unito/Cerp)

“Controlled Growth”

Abstract. Family firms are the most common model of economic organization, so understanding the determinants of their growth is important for economic policy. We use data on a large panel of European firms to explore the effects of family control on firms’ growth. We first provide evidence of highly profitable but small firms, with concentrated ownership, and debt-oriented capital structures. We then estimate a model of control, capital structure, and managerial effort decisions in a setting with corporate taxation, costly bankruptcy, and adverse selection. The model estimates help quantify the relative contribution of institutional frictions, technological factors, and social values in explaining family firms’ growth, capital structure, and performance.

Zoom Link

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82612000967?pwd=c016QVdRMGozREJmSlAzNGxISE1Bdz09

Meeting ID: 826 1200 0967

Passcode: 975554