Eugene Finkel (Johns Hopkins University)

Flying with the Stars: Performance, Loyalty, and Awards in the Soviet Air Force during WWII

Abstract: A main debate in the study of authoritarianism concerns whether autocrats promote agents based on performance or loyalty to stave off the threat of elite coups. Yet autocrats often face existential situations, particularly military conflict, where their survival depends on the performance of lower-level cadres. We develop a new theoretical framework for understanding how autocrats manage bureaucratic selection under crisis. Introducing the concept of ‘bounded meritocracy’, we theorize that although merit dominates cadre decisions, autocrats also strategically prioritize non-merit considerations in order to prevent defection by out-group members. To test our hypotheses, we combine archival work with a new dataset of 2,820 Soviet fighter pilots during WWII, including unique measures of individual performance, loyalty and out-group status. Wartime imperatives led Soviet officials to prioritize merit over party, while
also trumpeting non-Slavic aces as part of a propaganda campaign to increase support for the war effort among potentially disloyal minority groups.